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or via legislation. Mediator immunity is constructed by analogy to that given to judges, but
argued, do not require protection from litigation because the parties are responsible for the
ﬁnal settlement outcome. In Australia and the USA, mediators are usually provided with
immunity in mandatory, ‘court-annexed’ programmes, although this varies from an
absolute to a qualiﬁed level that is constrained by bad faith or dishonesty. In the English
jurisdiction, mediation is court-connected and parties are dissuaded from accessing the
courts through the risk of costs penalties or automatic referral schemes. Therefore, the time
is opportune for a review of many issues involved in mediation development, including
immunity. This paper considers the reasoning for extending immunity to mediators, before
concluding that the subject should not be determined through legal action until after a
comprehensive review of mediation developments and after a consideration of mediator
standards and regulation of practice.
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In common law countries where the ‘modern mediation movement’1 has a longer
history than in England and Wales, there has been considerable debate about mediator
immunity. Scholarly articles deliberate on the appropriateness of mediators being
afforded protection from legal action, which is analogous to immunity given to judges
acting in their ofﬁcial capacity in the formal system of litigation.2 In some federal juris-
dictions, mediators are protected from litigation claims, but this varies from absolute1. N Alexander Global Trends in Mediation (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 2nd edn,
2006) p 1.
2. See eg R Carroll ‘Mediator immunity in Australia’ (2001) 23 Sydney L Rev 185; R Carroll
‘Trends in mediation legislation: “all for one and one for all” or “one at all”?’ (2001–2002) 30 U
W Aust’l L Rev 167; A Chaykin ‘The liabilities and immunities of mediators: a hostile environ-
ment for model legislation’ (1986–1987) 2 Ohio St J Disp Resol 47; A Esquibel ‘The case of the
conﬂicted mediator: an argument for liability and against immunity’ (1999–2000) 31 Rutgers L J
131; J Stulberg ‘Mediator immunity’ (1986–1987) 2 Ohio St J Disp Resol 85; Yun Zhao and
AKCKoo ‘Revisiting the issue of mediator immunity: the way forward for prospective mediation
legislation in Hong Kong’ (2011) Hong Kong L J 677; C Turner ‘Mediator immunity stretching
the doctrine of absolute quasi-judicial immunity:Wagshal v Foster’ (1994–1995) 63 GeoWash L
Rev 759.
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2 Legal Studiesimmunity in some court-annexed programmes to partial immunity in others, although
private mediators usually, but not always, practise without legal safeguards other than
those provided through contract, insurance or conﬁdentiality agreements.3
In the English jurisdiction mediators do not have immunity; nor has the subject raised
substantial debate despite the increasing legal pressure from the Civil Procedure Rules
(CPR), which permit costs against successful litigants when they unreasonably refuse to
use ADR or mediation.4 This paper examines whether policy makers and stakeholders
in England andWales should review mediator immunity when there are calls from some
‘quarters’, including part of the judiciary, to compel even reluctant parties to mediate.5
Mediator immunity in Australia and the USA is, on the whole, concerned with
‘court-annexed’ programmes, which permit mandatory referral to mediation, and it
can be argued that there is no pressing need for immunity in jurisdictions where
mediating remains in the ‘private’ arena. There are, however, court schemes in England
and Wales where the parties are ‘automatically referred’ to mediation, such as in the
Court of Appeal and the Small ClaimsMediation Service (SCMS), although these court
programmes operate on the basis of opting in, to which either party can object.6
Mediation is also closely connected to the Technology and Construction Court3. In California, private mediators have been afforded immunity. See R Cole et al Mediation:
Law, Policy and Practice (Westlaw International Database, 2013) (hereinafter, ‘Cole et al’) at s
11.12. The authors cite Goad v Ervin, 2003 WL 22753608 (Cal App 4th Dist 2003), unpub-
lished/non-citable. See also NADRAC (2006) Legislating for Alternative Dispute Resolution:
A Guide for Government Public Policy-Makers and Legal Drafters, available at https://www.
ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Documents/NADRAC%20Publications/
Legislating%20for%20Alternative%20Dispute%20Resolution.PDF (accessed 27 April 2016);
NADRAC (2011) Maintaining and Enhancing the Integrity of ADR Processes, available at
https://www.ag.gov.au/LegalSystem/AlternateDisputeResolution/Documents/NADRAC%
20Publications/Maintaining%20and%20enhancing%20the%20integrity%20of%20ADR%
20processes%20%20From%20principles%20to%20practice%20through%20people.PDF
(accessed 27 April 2016).
4. Civil Procedure Rule (CPR) 44.4(i), (ii).
5. Norris J in Bradley v Heslin [2014] EWHC 3267 recommends that judges should issue a two-
month stay in neighbour and boundary disputes even if both parties disagree about mediating
(para 23); available at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/JCO/Documents/Guid-
ance/civil_court_mediation_service_manual_v3_mar09.pdf (accessed 23 June 2015). See T Al-
len ‘Requiring mediation in intractable cases: a note on Bradley v Heslin’ CEDR Article,
available at http://www.cedr.com/articles/?item=Requiring-mediation-in-intractable-cases-a-
note-on-Bradley-v-Heslin (accessed 2 March 2015). Sir Alan Ward in Wright v Michael Wright
Supplies Ltd & Anor [2013] EWCA Civ 234 at 3; Lord Justice Clarke ‘The future of civil medi-
ation’ (2008) 74(4) Arbitration 419. See P Brooker ‘Mediating in good faith in the English and
Welsh jurisdiction: lessons from other common law countries’ (2014) 43 Comm L Rev 120 at
151.
6. CPR 26(4)A(2)(b). Small claims (less than £10,000) can be referred by the court to the Small
Claim Mediation Service (SCMS) if the parties have not refused to use the facility; see https://
www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/JCO/Documents/Guidance/
civil_court_mediation_service_manual_v3_mar09.pdf (accessed 17 July 2015). The SCMS is
managed by Her Majesty’s Court and Tribunal Service (HMCTS); see http://www.justice.gov.
uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part26 (accessed 27 April 2016). The Court of Appeal
Mediation Scheme is organised by the Centre for Dispute Resolution (CEDR); see https://
www.justice.gov.uk/courts/rcj-rolls-building/court-of-appeal/civil-division/mediation (accessed
17 July 2015).
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Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 3(TCC), which permits judges to act as mediators at the parties’ requests.7 Legal policies
that stray towards mandatory mediation or induce or inﬂuence the choice of mediating
should lead to dialogue on how to guarantee the quality of mediators, but consideration
should also be given to whether mediators are entitled to be protected from unhappy
participants, who perhaps would not have chosen that route without pressure – but this
should be balanced against the users’ rights to seek a remedy when there has been
misconduct or a lack of skills.Deﬁnitional issues
‘Court-annexed mediation’ is usually taken to mean programmes where disputants are
mandated to attend before accessing the court.8 In the USA and Australia, mediators in
these schemes are often court-approved and are required to have reached speciﬁc
standards, experience and training, which are frequently set down by court rules.9
‘Private mediation’ is sometimes referred to as voluntary or ‘community mediation’
when it signiﬁes that the parties have freely engaged a mediator external to a mandatory
court scheme. ‘Court-connected mediation’ is a broader categorisation and it can be
understood to include court-annexed mediation, but it has also been taken to comprise
private or voluntary mediations that are linked to the courts through rules requiring
litigants to consider or attempt mediation before litigating, or when they have
commenced mediation voluntarily during the phases of litigation.10
This paper distinguishes between ‘court-annexed mediation’, which is used in
relation to mandatory schemes, and ‘court-connected mediation’, when the process is
voluntary but undertaken by litigants because of requirements from civil procedures
rules or court protocols.11 The signiﬁcance of the distinction is that in England and
Wales, mediation is private and voluntary, but if the parties subsequently litigate then
court rules on ADR and mediation will apply and penalties for failing to mediate can
be used by the court.12 The question of mediator immunity is therefore not conﬁned
to a distinction between ‘private’ or ‘court-annexed mediations’ but also ‘court-
connected mediation’, which some commentators say ‘coerces’ participation.137. See the Technology and Construction Court Guide (2nd edn, 3rd rev, 2014). Litigants in the
TCC may ask the judge to act as an Early Neutral Evaluator, which may be through mediation
(7.6.1).
8. See eg NADRAC (2006), above n 3, ss 42–44.
9. See eg K Kovach ‘The evolution of mediation in the United States: issues ripe for regulation
may shape the future of practice’, in Alexander, above n 1, pp 429–430.
10. See eg the USA ‘National Standards for Court-Connected Mediation Programs’
(NSCCMP), which apply to ‘any program or service, including a service provided by an individ-
ual, to which a court refers cases on a voluntary or mandatory basis, including any program or
service operated by the court’ (NSCCMP, Deﬁnitions, iv).
11. See CPR r26.4. See eg Pre-Action Protocol for Construction and Engineering Disputes 1.3
(ii), 2(vi) and 5.2.
12. CPR s44(i), (ii).
13. MBrunsdon-Tully ‘There is an A in ADR but does anyone know what it means anymore?’
(2009) 28 Civ Just Q 218 at 232; see also Hong Kong Civil Justice Rules (CJR). For a discussion
of the developments in Hong Kong, see eg G Weixia ‘Civil justice reform in Hong Kong:
challenges and opportunities for development of alternative dispute resolution’ (2010) 40(1)
Hong Kong L 43; S Cheung ‘Construction mediation landscape in the civil justice system in
Hong Kong’ (2010) 2(3) J Legal Aff & Disp Resol in Engng & Construct 169.
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4 Legal StudiesThis paper will explore the policy reasons behind judicial immunity before
considering the theories underpinning the expansion of absolute or partial immunity
to third-party neutrals acting as mediators in court-annexed programmes and sometimes
in private contexts. An examination is made of the potential legal liabilities that
mediators face as growing numbers mediate before recommendations are made for
future action in England and Wales.JUDICIAL IMMUNITY
Lord Justice Holdsworth was one of the ﬁrst modern legal historians to review judicial
immunity in England.14 Prior to medieval times, a party could raise a ‘complaint’
against a member of the judiciary, but judges in ‘courts of record’ were given ‘sanctity’
for both acting outside their jurisdiction or for abuse of jurisdiction.15 The common law
drew a distinction between ‘superior’ and ‘inferior courts of record’, which do not have
absolute immunity because of the opportunity for appeal to the higher courts for
jurisdictional errors.16 Common law legal scholars argue that cases on judicial
immunity are not based on clear criteria or precedent, which casts doubt on the
legitimacy of the rule.17 Murphy, for example, reviews English case-law and maintains
that judicial reasoning is ‘couched in obviously exaggerated terms (and therefore
bogus), empirically ungrounded (and therefore dubious) or entirely spurious’.18
The basis of judicial immunity explicated by jurists such as Coke during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries was grounded on ‘public policy’ when the prestige of judges
was ‘magniﬁed’ and immunity was given because they were accountable only to ‘God
and the King’.19 Most common law countries recognise a number of public policies
underpinning judicial immunity, but the key reasons are to protect the ‘independence’
of judges from ‘coercion in their decision-making function’,20 bring litigation to an
end,21 support the ‘administration of justice’22 and prevent ‘scandal’ that could
‘damage public conﬁdence’ in the court system.23 The judiciary to this day restate these
policies and highlight the importance of judicial ‘impartiality and independence’ on the14. Lord Justice Holdsworth ‘Immunity for judicial acts’ (1924) Soc Pub Teachers L 17.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid, pp 18–19. LJ Holdsworth notes that from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, im-
munity did not cover judges acting ‘without jurisdiction’.
17. See eg J Murphy ‘Rethinking tortious immunity for judicial acts’ (2013) 33(3) Legal Stud
455 at 458–459; S Hughes ‘Mediator immunity: the misguided and inequitable shifting of risk’
(2004) 83 Or L Rev 107; A Nicol ‘Judicial immunity and human rights’ (2006) Eur Hum Rts
L Rev 558; D Thompson ‘Judicial immunity and the protection of justices’ (1958) 21 Mod L
Rev 517 at 517.
18. Murphy, ibid, at 457.
19. LJ Holdsworth, above n 14, at 18–19, citing Coke para 25.
20. Ibid, at 19, citing Coke para 25. For a review of judicial immunity in the common law, see
eg Murphy, above n 17, at 455–477; Hughes, above n 17.
21. LJ Holdsworth, above n 14, at 19, citing Coke 1606 12 Co Rep 23 para 25. For a review of
judicial immunity in the common law, see eg Murphy, above n 17, at 455–477; Hughes, above n
17; Turner, above n 2.
22. See Hughes, above n 17, at 114.
23. Ibid, at 114; Murphy, above n 17, at 463–464.
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Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 5grounds that judges must be protected from ‘improper pressure’ from ‘litigants’.24
Present-day views are critical of ‘unconvincing’ policy reasons given for judicial
immunity, which Murphy states was ‘crafted by judges for judges’, where the judiciary
is ‘seen to be above the law’ because if people are ‘equal in law’, then where there is
harm there should be a ‘remedy’.25
Limitations on ‘absolute’ judicial immunity
There are restrictions in the English jurisdiction to ‘absolute immunity’ and judges have
no defence for ‘extrajudicial’ conduct such as causing damage to a person or their
property, or creating doubts about another’s credibility when acting in a personal
capacity.26 Nor are judges immune when acting outside their jurisdiction.27 Case-law
implies that judges, in exercising decisions on jurisdiction, must do so in ‘good faith’,
although there is uncertainty about whether this test is an objective or subjective
standard, but it does conﬁrm that ‘excess of jurisdiction’ may result in a ‘loss of
immunity’.28
The claims that judges have ‘absolute immunity’ are therefore over-expansive and
there are persuasive arguments for greater limitations. For example, Murphy would
restrict immunity to a ‘qualiﬁed’ level constructed on the basis that the judiciary
exercise ‘administrative power’, which should be carried out ‘for public good not for
improper purposes’, and that when they use their position in a ‘malicious’, ‘reckless’
or ‘corrupt way’, the parties should have redress through the ‘tort of misfeasance’.29
Notwithstanding arguments for limiting judicial immunity, some common law
countries have extended protection to other neutrals who act in a ‘judicial capacity’.30
ARBITRATORS’ IMMUNITY
In England and Wales, arbitrators have had a form of ‘quasi-immunity’ since the early
seventeenth century.31 The basis of arbitral immunity is that, like judges, arbitrators
have a decision making role that requires safeguarding in order to preserve their
impartiality, prevent court ‘intrusion’ and bring disputes to an end, but ‘quasi-24. Judiciary website, available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judi-
ciary-in-detail/jud-acc-ind/independence#headingAnchor7 (accessed 27 March 2013).
25. Murphy, above n 17, at 455. See also Esquibel, above n 2, at 172; Nicol, above n 17, at 558.
26. See Murphy, above n 17, at 485; Zhao and Koo, above n 2, at 679–680.
27. Murphy, above n 17, at 458, citing Sirros v Moore [1975] QB 118 para 134.
28. Ibid, citing Sirros para 137.
29. Ibid, at 459, citing Lord Steyn in Three Rivers DC v Governor and Company of the Bank of
England (No 3) [2003] AC 1; see Esquibel, above n 2.
30. See eg Esquibel, above n 2, at 142, 130; C Joseph ‘The scope of mediator immunity: when
mediators can invoke absolute immunity’ (1996-1997) 12 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 629 at 633.
31. Other common law countries have followed this direction. See eg T Stipanowich ‘The ar-
bitration penumbra: arbitration law and the rapidly changing landscape of dispute resolution’
(2007–2008) 8 Nev L J 427; H Hebaishi ‘Should arbitrator immunity be preserved under English
Law?’ (2014) 2 NE L Rev 45; D Nolan and R Abrams ‘Arbitral immunity’ (2014) 11 Berkeley J
Emp & Lab L Article 2, 228 (reproduced); D Bristow and J Parke ‘Canada – the gathering storm
of arbitrators’ and mediators’ liability’ (2001) Intern ALR 135; Yu-Hong Lin and L Shore ‘Inde-
pendence, impartiality, and immunity of arbitrators – US and English perspectives’ (2003) 52(4)
Int’l & Comp L Q 954; R Carroll ‘Quasi-judicial immunity: the arbitrator’s shield or sword?’
(1991) J Disp Resol 137.
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6 Legal Studiesarbitrators’ such as architects or evaluators will only be immune if there is a ‘formulated
dispute’ between the parties that they have to determine.32
Under s 29 (1) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (AA 1996), arbitral immunity prevents
liability ‘unless the act or omission is shown to have been in bad faith’.33 The insertion
of ‘good faith’ into the AA 1996 raised substantial debate because of the abstruseness
surrounding the concept, which encompassed ‘dishonesty’, ‘malice’ ‘or knowledge of
absence of power to make the decision in question’.34 Arbitral immunity is not without
its critics, particularly on the grounds that arbitrators do not have an identical role to
judges, because they are appointed by the parties and ought to be accountable to them
for their negligence or misbehaviour, but also because of the problems surrounding how
good faith is evaluated by the courts.35THEEXTENSIONOF IMMUNITYTOOTHERDISPUTE-RESOLUTIONNEUTRALS
Common law in the USA
In spite of cogent arguments for limiting both judicial and arbitral immunity where there
is malicious conduct or an absence of good faith, a number of common law countries
have taken substantial steps to shield third-party neutrals from legal action, particularly
in court-annexed programmes.36 Four key contentions have been identiﬁed for
endorsing immunity.37 First, mediators need ‘protection against defamation’ to encour-
age the parties to mediate with ‘candour’, which is essential for moving the parties
towards settlement.38 Secondly, immunity supports the ‘ﬁnality’ of disputes, without
endless appeals to uphold mediation settlements. The foundation for this assertion is
that ‘facilitative’mediators are not accountable for the outcome of the mediation, which
is the preserve of the parties,39 and that immunity prevents the participants trying to go
back on their agreements by suing the mediator.40 Thirdly, it is argued that the ‘integ-
rity’ of mediation is put at risk when claims are made about mediators, which thereby
require evidence in court from a process promoted as being ‘conﬁdential’.41 Exponents32. Arenson v Arenson [1977] AC 405; Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727. See eg T Oyre
‘Professional liability and judicial immunity’ (1998) 64(1) Arbitration 45 at 46; C Mulcahy ‘Ar
bitrator’s immunity under the new Arbitration Act’ (2006) 62(3) Arbitration 202; ibid. For a dis
cussion on arbitration in the USA, see Stipanowich, above n 31.
33. Section 29(1) Arbitration Act 1996; Oyre, above n 32, at 49. Oyre notes that the Arbitration
Act sought to ‘close loopholes’ by extending immunity to ‘employees or agents of the arbitrator
under s 29(2) and to ‘Arbitral Institutions’ under s 74.
34. See Hebaishi, above n 31, at 24–25; Oyre, above n 32, at 46; See also Mulcahy, above n 32
at 202. Mulcahy cites Megaw J in Cannock Chase Council v Kelly [1978] 1 WLR 1 para 6D–E
35. Hebaishi above n 31; arbitral good faith is discussed later when mediators’ good faith i
raised. Mulcahy, above n 32, at 204; See also J Li ‘Arbitral immunity: a profession comes o
age’ (1998) 64(1) Arbitration 51.
36. See eg Joseph, above n 30.
37. See Department of Justice, the Government of the Hong Kong, Special Administrative
Region Report of the Working Group on Mediation (2010) (hereinafter ‘Hong Kong Report’).
38. Ibid, ch 7.154. See also Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 206.
39. See eg Stulberg, above n 2; NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4.
40. See eg Hong Kong Report, above n 37, ch 7.156.
41. Ibid, ch 7.154; P Brooker Mediation Law: Journey through Institutionalisation to
Juridiﬁcation (London: Routledge, 2013) ch 5, p 187; R Toulson and C Phipps On Conﬁdential
ity (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006); A Koo ‘Conﬁdentiality of mediation communications
(2011) 30(3) Civ Just Q 192.
© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars-
-
’
,
.
s
f
-
’
Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 7of mediation view conﬁdentiality to be the ‘catalyst’ that enables the parties to discuss
their dispute, and make ‘disclosures’ or ‘admissions of liability’while working towards
settlement.42 When information from mediation is produced in court, this ‘undermines
conﬁdence in the conﬁdential nature of mediation’ and diminishes the ‘trust’ between
the mediator and participants.43 Fourthly, concerns are voiced about the effect that a
want of immunity will have on mediation, because mediators may elect to mediate in
ways to avoid litigation, which could result in the process becoming ‘too prescriptive’
or ‘legalistic’.44 Advocates for immunity consider that mediators should be able to de-
cide the best approach to mediation without anxiety about being sued.45
A further apprehension is that without protection there will be an inadequate supply
of mediators for the ‘efﬁcient’ running of court-annexed programmes,46 which was also
used in the debate for affording arbitrators’ immunity prior to the AA1996.47 If the
same justiﬁcations for judicial and arbitrators’ immunity apply to mediation, then
Chaykin argues that mediators should be invulnerable but doubts that there is sufﬁcient
‘empirical evidence’ to support the claim that the role of judges, arbitrators or mediators
will not be carried out without protection.48 Arbitrators have acted for centuries when
the issue of immunity was less clear-cut; and there is little evidence that a lack of
immunity will deter mediators in England andWales at this juncture, as there are reports
of a glut of newly trained practitioners who are unable to gain a foothold in the
emerging profession.49
Immunity for third-party decision makers
Commentators in the USA have noted the common law advancing a form of ‘quasi-
judicial immunity’ to ‘hearing ofﬁcers’; ‘state prosecutors’ or ‘parole ofﬁcers’ when
they are appointed through the judicial system.50 The basis for this extension is that they
are appointed to assist ‘court administration’ and often have a decision making role akin
to judges, which means that they are involved in ‘judicial acts’,51 which Thompson
observes has led some commentators to ‘assume’ that immunity is extended to neutrals
who have a ‘judicial function’.52 The theoretical justiﬁcation for expanding absolute42. A Bevan Alternative Dispute Resolution (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1992) p 19. See eg
Kovach, above n 9, p 439; Toulson and Phipps, above n 41, s 15.016: ‘… it would destroy the
basis of mediation if, in the case of the mediation failing, either party could publicise matters
which had passed between themselves or between either of them and the mediator’.
43. Kovach, above n 42, pp 438–439.
44. Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 209; see also Hong Kong Report, above n 37, ch 7.152.
45. Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 208.
46. Hong Kong Report, above n 37, ch 7.162.
47. See Hebaishi, above n 31; Lord Donaldson of Lymington stated that if he had to insure him-
self as an ‘occasional’ arbitrator. he would ‘cease’ to undertake this role in the future. See Han-
sard, Ofﬁcial Report of the Committee on the Arbitration Bill [H.L.], HL Deb 28, vol. 569, cc1–
30GC 1GC, February 1996 (accessed 13 October 2015).
48. AChaykin ‘Mediator liability: a new role for ﬁduciary studies’ (1984) 53UCinLRev 731 at 762.
49. CEDR Mediation Audit 2014, available at http://www.cedr.com/about_us/modeldocs/
(accessed 25 February 2015) at 10. The Audit reports that there is an ‘over-supply’ of new me-
diators, who cannot break into a limited market.
50. See eg Hughes, above n 17; Esquibel, above n 2; Cole et al, above n 3.
51. Hughes, above n 17, at 125.
52. N Thompson ‘Enforcing rights generated in court-connected mediation--tension between
the aspirations of a private facilitative process and the reality of public adversarial justice’
(2004) 19 Ohio St J on Disp Resol 509 at 517.
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8 Legal Studiesimmunity to neutrals involved in determining cases in the USA is based on
safeguarding their ‘quasi-judicial functions’ rather than the ‘individual’, which Turner
asserts is grounded on ‘policy considerations’.53Extension of common law immunity for mediators who do not make decisions
In the USA, the common law has also extended absolute immunity to third-party
neutrals who do not decide cases.54 In Howard v Drapkin, the Appeal Court in
California held that immunity could be given to ‘mediators, conciliators and evaluators’
on the basis that ‘they are connected to the judicial process’ and their role entails
‘attempt(ing) to resolve disputes’ which is ‘similar to a judge who handles a mandatory
settlement conference’.55 The court feared that without this protection, neutrals would
be either ‘reluctant’ to undertake this work or anxious that they would face litigation
that could inﬂuence the way in which ‘they perform their jobs’, but the court was also
swayed by the beneﬁts that the court system and the parties gain from using ADR
neutrals:56
Besides relieving court congestion and speeding up the conclusion of cases, these less-traditional
alternative dispute resolution procedures are often less expensive and less stressful than
seeing a case through its normal trial path. Like the more formal dispute resolution proce-
dures, they are critical to the proper functioning of our increasingly congested trial courts.
In Wagshal v Foster, a federal court acknowledged that immunity existed for a case
evaluator but used the label ‘interchangeably’with a court-appointed mediator, who the
plaintiff claimed had ‘forced’ him to settle at a ‘disadvantageous or lower ﬁgure’.57
Immunity was granted because the neutral undertook ‘tasks’ such as ‘identifying factual
and legal issues, scheduling discovery and motions with the parties and coordinating
settlement effort’, which were ‘precisely’ the same that judges undertake ‘going about
the business of adjudication and case management’.58 The court reﬁned a threefold test
for immunity:59 ﬁrst, the role of the neutral must be ‘comparable to those of a judge’;
secondly, consideration must be given to whether the dispute may lead the parties to
‘harassment or intimidation’ of the neutral; and, thirdly, immunity will only be given
where the scheme for appointing neutrals provides ‘safeguards’ that ‘justify’ removing
the right to litigate. The court concluded that the mediation programme operating in
Wagshal v Foster had ‘adequate safeguards’ in place because the plaintiff could have
approached the judge for ‘relief from any misconduct’ or, if concerned that the judge53. Turner, above n 2, at 765–768, citing Butz v Economou (1978) 438 US 478.
54. See eg Hughes, above n 17; Esquibel, above n 2; Cole et al, above n 3.
55. Esquibel, above n 2, at 149–150 cites the California Court of Appeal in Howard v Drapkin
222 Cal App 3d 843 2nd Dist, 3rd Div (Ct App 1990), which concerned immunity for a psychol-
ogist appointed by both parties in a child ‘custody’ dispute.
56. Ibid, Howard v Drapkin ss (d) and (e). See Turner, above n 2, at 853.
57. Wagshal v Foster, 28 F 3d 1249 (DC Cir 1994). The court afﬁrmed that the difference
between mediators and evaluators is that mediators help the parties ‘explore settlement’ whereas
evaluators assist them to ‘assess their cases’ (at 2). For an analysis of Wagshal v Foster, see eg
Hughes, above n 17; Turner, above n 2; R Burnley and G Lascelles ‘Mediation conﬁdentiality:
conduct and communications’ (2004) 70(1) Arbitration 28 at 31–32; Esquibel, above n 2, at
150; Hughes, above n 17, at 132–141.
58. Ibid, Wagshal v Foster s 2.
59. Wagshal, above n 57, at 4; Turner above n 2, at 772–774.
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disqualiﬁcation.60Mediator function
Extending immunity to mediators who do not issue decisions is based on the analogy
that they share a ‘similar function’ to that of judges.61 As ‘administrators of justice’,
they provide a substitute for the judiciary, particularly in ‘court-annexed programmes’,
where the process is deemed to be part of ‘case management’.62 This analysis is
disputed by many opponents of immunity. For example, Chaykin observes that
‘primarily’ the mediator’s relationship to the participants is as a ‘conﬁdant’ or
‘counsellor’ who helps them to ‘identify issues, clarify applicable law, and explore
areas of compromise’.63 Turner summarises mediator ‘tasks’ as those of organising
the setting and the structure of mediation to enable the parties to achieve a consensual
settlement while assisting them to evaluate their dispute.64 Although some of these
‘tasks’ may be comparable to those undertaken by a judge, Turner states that this does
not mean that they share the same responsibility as the judiciary who rule on cases, and
therefore that immunity is not justiﬁed:65
The important question in comparing mediators to judges is not whether they share some sim-
ilar tasks or have similar goals, but whether mediators perform functions sufﬁciently to the
function that originally justiﬁed the judge’s immunity: the adjudicatory ‘function’.
Although some legal scholars recognise that mediators in ‘court-annexed’ schemes
perform a ‘quasi-judicial function’, many others suggest that it is difﬁcult to justify
immunity for facilitative ADR processes because facilitating settlement is not the
foundation of judicial immunity.66 Moreover, critics argue that when mediators only
facilitate settlement, they make ‘procedural (not substantive decisions)’, which is not
a ‘judicial or quasi-judicial’ role, and provides little potential for legal claims against
them.67 Practitioners and researchers, however, recognise that the mediator’s role
involves more than facilitating settlement, because it may also involve giving advice
or protecting parties who are not legally represented.68 Sometimes, mediators provide
an evaluative role when they offer ‘special or expert information’, which may make
them more ‘vulnerable’ to litigation.69 There is now substantial empirical evidence that
mediators who work in court-annexed programmes, court-connected mediation and in60. Wagshal, above n 57, at 6.
61. See Turner, above n 2, at 775–783.
62. NADRAC (2006), above n 3, s 8.30.
63. Chaykin, n 48, at 735. See also Turner, above n 2, at 776: Turner bases her analysis of the
mediator’s role on Chaykin.
64. Turner, above n 2, at 776. It is noted that the case management role for judges involves
facilitative tasks such as encouraging mediation, and s 34(2)(g) of the Arbitration Act permits
arbitrators to take a ‘inquisitorial role’ with the parties’ permission.
65. Turner, above n 2, at 777–778.
66. Ibid.
67. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4.
68. Chaykin, above n 48, at 762; see eg L Riskin ‘Understanding mediators’ orientations, strat-
egies and techniques: a grid for the perplexed’ (1996) Harv Negot L Rev 1.
69. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4. See also NADRAC (2006), above n 3, s 8.23; Hong
Kong Report, above n 37, ch 7.149.
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10 Legal Studiesprivate work do adopt evaluation into their practice.70 Chaykin observes that when
mediators evaluate, they should have a higher duty in relation to that advice,
particularly when it involves legal issues, and that immunity should not be afforded
when wrong information disadvantages the parties:71
…mediators are not hiredmerely to be objective decision makers; they are expected to provide
advice, to structure discussion, and attempt to ensure a durable agreement. The judge generally
has no duty to the litigants except to decide the case. To the extent that people rely on and trust
a mediator in a way that they do not with judges, there is a strong argument that the immunity
should not be extended.
Regardless of these challenges to immunity in the literature, a California Appeal
Courts extended ‘absolute’ protection to mediators employed in the private sector
following a court order to mediate72 and immunity to an ADR organisation after the
claimant alleged that the recommended mediator had not carried out the mediation
adequately.73 However, Cole et al doubt that the common law in the USA will ﬁnd a
new ‘absolute’ immunity for mediators who do not decide cases, following the Supreme
Court decision in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v Vedatech Intern., Inc., which held
that they do not require protecting from litigation.74
The Australian court in Taphooi v Lewenberg took a different approach to the USA
common law by suggesting that there might be a case to answer on the standard of care
owed by the mediator who had been appointed by two sisters in a dispute over property
that had been jointly left to them.75 The mediation had gone on into the evening, with
the mediator pushing the participants for a signed agreement before leaving, and
althoughMs Taphooi’s representatives claimed to have drawn attention to the necessity
for further consultation on the tax issue, this was not drawn up as an ‘express’ term in
the settlement agreement.76 Basing his decision on the English case of Arenson v
Arenson, Habersberger J. held that immunity for negligence should only ‘exist where
there were strong public policy grounds’ because those who ‘breach a legal obligation
to take reasonable care should be answerable to the court to compensate those to whom
they have caused damage by their negligence’.77 Taphooi v Lewenberg did not proceed70. See eg Riskin, above n 68. The literature on the evaluative/facilitative divide is extensive in
the USA: see eg K Kovach and P Love ‘“Evaluative” mediation is an oxymoron’ (1996) 14 Alt
High Cost Litig 31; K Kovach and L Love ‘Mapping mediation: the risks of Riskin’s grid’ (1998)
3 Harv Negot L Rev 71 at 109; J Stulberg ’Facilitative versus evaluative mediator orientations:
piercing the grid’ (1997) 24 Fla St U L Rev 985. For an overview of the debate and developments
in England and Wales, see eg P Brooker ‘An investigation of evaluative and facilitative
approaches to construction mediation’ (2007) 25(3/4) Struct Surv 220.
71. Chaykin, above n 48, at 762.
72. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.12, citing Goad v Ervin, 2003 WL 22753608 (Cal App 4th Dist
2003), unpublished/non-citable.
73. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.12, citing Simpson v JAMS/Endispute, LLC, No A110634, 2006
WL 2076028 (Cal App 1 Dist 26 July 2006), unpublished/non-citable.
74. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.12, citing St. Paul Fire &Marine Ins. Co. v Vedatech Intern., Inc.,
245 Fed Appx 588 (9th Cir, 2007).
75. Taphooi v Lewenberg [2003] (No 2) VSC 410 Supreme Court of Victoria, Commercial and
Equity Division (21 October 2003) para 86. For an analysis of the case, see eg Zhao and Koo,
above n 2; NADRAC (2001), above n 3, s 5.4.
76. Taphooi, above n 75, paras 35, 36.
77. Arenson v Arenson [1977], above n 32.
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Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 11further in litigation; therefore, the matter was left unresolved by the common law in
Australia.78
It is emphasised in the literature that immunity, particularly in its absolute form, is
‘exceptional’79 and should not be extending to mediators who do not need the same
protection that judges require in performing their role independently, without pressure
from the parties.80 Chaykin bases his opposition on the dissimilarity of mediation to
litigation and arbitration, because the latter procedures are founded on the ‘force of
the law’, whereas mediation is built on ‘trust’ between the parties and the mediator.81
He asserts that endowing mediators with immunity potentially leads to cynicism and,
furthermore, ‘encourages carelessness by removing the incentive of cautiousness’.82
Hughes’ criticism is based on the contention that it represents an ‘inequitable shifting
of risk’ from the mediators’ deﬁciencies to the ‘unlucky’ parties who experience such
conduct, and claims that academics have not addressed the problem of the ‘economic
impact’ of protecting mediators from legal action.83 Hemaintains that future parties will
not mediate if they have to take on this ‘risk’, although Cole et al disagree with this
inference, on the grounds that there is insufﬁcient evidence in the USA that immunity
reduces the likelihood of mediating.84
The main argument against immunity is that injured parties have no solution when
they have suffered loss through the shortcomings or misconduct of mediators.85 Carroll
considers that the public receives a ‘collective beneﬁt’ when those who harm others
have to make recompense to those who have been wronged, and that mediator immu-
nity removes an important goal in the ‘avenue of social regulation’.86 By the same
token, it is argued that it is a ‘fundamental fairness’ that mediators are able to ‘defend’
themselves by responding to ‘allegations’.87 These two lines of reasoning lead to
support for partial immunity, which creates a balance between protecting parties in
order that they can bring evidence to court to prove incompetency or bad behaviour
while still providing mediators with a defence in litigation.88Partial or qualiﬁed immunity
The provision of partial immunity has largely evolved through statutory provisions in
the USA and Australia. Hughes reveals that by 2004, 38 states in the USA had over
96 statutes or rules covering immunity and, more recently, Cole et al noted an
inconsistent approach across federal jurisdictions from matching ‘absolute’ judicial
immunity to that of ‘qualiﬁed immunity’.89 Limitations to full immunity include where
the mediator has acted in ‘bad faith’ or where there has been ‘wanton or wilful78. Taphooi, above n 75, para 69. See Zhao and Koo, above n 2.
79. See eg Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 195; Chaykin, above n 2, at 81; Turner, above n 2, at 776.
80. See eg Hong Kong Report, above n 37, para 7.149; Hughes, above n 17; NADRAC (2011),
above n 3, s 5.4.
81. Chaykin, above n 48, at 732.
82. Chaykin, above n 2, at 77.
83. Hughes, above n 17, at 111.
84. Ibid; Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.12.
85. Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 205.
86. Ibid, at 211.
87. Ibid, at 195.
88. Carroll (2001–2002), above n 2, at 214.
89. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.11, See also Hughes, above n 17, at 145.
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12 Legal Studiesmisconduct’ or ‘maliciousness’;90 moreover, a number of provisions ‘create a presump-
tion’ requiring ‘clear convincing evidence that the mediator has not acted in good
faith’.91 Despite bestowing immunity on mediators operating in court-annexed
schemes, there are very few provisions at state or federal level providing either full
or partial immunity for mediators acting in a ‘private capacity’.92
The Uniform Mediation Act in the USA
The Uniform Mediation Act 2003 (UMA) was introduced to provide consistency of
mediation law across federal states in the USA, but the drafters did not legislate for
immunity, which Laﬂin asserts was because it ensured a way of preserving their
‘accountability’.93 The UMA is concerned with privilege that attaches to ‘mediation
communications’ and various sections limit evidence from the mediation process,
thereby maintaining conﬁdentiality.94 Commentators point to the ‘express exception’
in s 6(a)(5), where evidence can be brought to ‘disprove a claim of professional
misconduct or malpractice’,95 which Burnley and Lascelles believe provides mediators
with an ‘effective defence’ while allowing the parties the opportunity for complaint.96
Furthermore, it is noted that claims of impartiality may be a cause of action under s 9,
which requires a mediator to make a ‘reasonable inquiry’ about potential conﬂicts of
interests and permits disclosure of evidence that a ‘reasonable individual’ might
perceive indicates bias,97 and the Act permits disclosure of mediation information
where there is a ‘serious risk of injury’ or where ‘duress’ has been used, which includes
mediator misconduct on these issues.98
The statutory approach to mediators’ immunity in Australia
Like the USA, Australia is a common law jurisdiction with a correspondingly long
experience of mediation, where many federal and state courts have adopted a
mandatory approach to mediating. Although there is no ‘general immunity from legal
action’ in Australia, various state and federal legislation provide either full or ‘qualiﬁed
immunity’ in court-annexed programmes.99 For example, NADRAC observe that s
53C of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 affords ‘ADR practitioners’ ‘referred’
by the Federal Courts the same immunity as magistrates and judges, but only ‘partial90. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.11, citing the Iowa Code Ann. s 679C.115 (2005): ‘Amediator or
a mediation program shall not be liable for civil damages for a statement, decision, or omission
made in the process of mediation unless the act or omission by the mediator or mediation program
ismade in bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting willful or wanton disregard
of human rights, safety, or property.’
91. Ibid, citing Hughes, above n 17, who discusses the presumption of good faith in Maine,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
92. Ibid.
93. MLaﬂin ‘Preserving the integrity of mediation through the adoption of ethical rules for law-
yer-mediators’ (2000) 14 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol’y 479 fn 149. See alsoMMofﬁtt ‘Ten
ways to get sued: guide for mediators’ (2003) 8 Harv Negot L Rev 81; Cole et al, above n 3, s
11.13.
94. See eg Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.13.
95. Carroll (2001–2002), above n 2, at 188. See also Laﬂin, above n 93; Cole et al, above n 3.
96. Burnley and Lascelles, above n 57, at 31–32. See also Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.13.
97. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.13, citing UMA ss 7(a), 10.
98. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.13.
99. NADRAC (2006), above n 3, s 8.12.
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Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 13immunity’ when practising in ‘Community Justice Centres’ when acting in ‘good
faith’.100 The Australian report recommended that when the courts refer people to
ADR (including mediation) ‘as part of a continuum of case management’, then
mediators should be protected because it could be seen as ‘an extension of the judicial
role’ and the settlement might be open to attack through litigation.101 In contrast, where
ADR procedures are on a ‘community basis’, NADRAC did not support immunity
because of the legislation covering ‘professional standards’, which restricts ‘civil liabil-
ity’ in other spheres of work.102
The 2006 report expressed speciﬁc concerns about the pressures facing mediation if
there were no immunity: ﬁrst, on the grounds that the parties expect the process to be
conﬁdential and that negotiations could be compromised if the communications were
allowed in ‘evidence’; and, secondly, that if mediators worry about litigation, this could
affect how they conduct the process by making it ‘more formal and legalistic’.103
Furthermore, NADRAC identiﬁed that ‘community’ or private mediators would be
disinclined to mediate if they were not given immunity, although the report felt that this
worry would lessen as the incidence of mediation escalates.104
In 2011, NADRAC was asked to review immunity again and although the report
revealed no consensus on the issue, some practitioners believed there was a need for
‘blanket immunity’ except for ‘fraud’.105 NADRAC once again distinguished between
‘private and mandatory ADR processes’ and recommended the continuance of partial
immunity for ‘court or tribunal staff’ when ‘acting in good faith’,106 but there was no
recommendation for immunity for mediators practising privately because of the
availability of ‘contractual indemnity and liability insurance’.107
Good faith
Many of the statutory immunity provisions in Australia and the USA provide qualiﬁed
protection that permits the parties to seek a remedy when the mediator has acted in ‘bad
faith’, which has been deﬁned as ‘palpable bias’ or acting ‘fraudulently’.108 Chaykin
observes that this standard may excuse a mediator who has furnished ‘foolish’ but
not ‘malicious’ advice, and argues against immunity for ‘information-giving’ because
this resembles the lawyers’ role, which is not protected.109 Hughes queries the
difﬁculties of determining where the level of liability should lie for mediators between
‘negligence’, ‘recklessness or intentional behaviour’, or whether the difference between
‘wanton’, ‘wilful’ or ‘malicious’ should be used: ‘This is an inquiry to which scholars
surrendered many years ago. Even embarking on such a journey of comparison and
analysis is absurd and would only amount to pure speculation.’110
Case-law in the USA shows that the concept of mediators acting in good faith has not
been easy to deﬁne, and Hughes believes that inconsistencies in interpretation will lead100. Cited by ibid, ss 8.14, 8.17.
101. Ibid, ss 8.30, 8.12.
102. Ibid, s 8.31.
103. Ibid, ss 8.2, 8.4.
104. Ibid, ss 8.5, 8.25.1.
105. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, ss 5.1, 5.5.
106. Ibid, s 5.9.3.
107. Ibid, s 5.5.1.
108. Chaykin, above n 48, at 763.
109. Ibid.
110. Hughes, above n 17, at 155.
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14 Legal Studiesto ‘incessant litigation’.111 There have also been problems with establishing the
meaning of good faith in the context of arbitration in the English jurisdiction, despite
observations by the Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration (DAC) and
commentary in Hansard, which suggested that the term was ‘well established’ in the
case-law prior to the enactment of the AA 1996.112 Nearly 20 years later, clarity has
not been achieved and Hebaishi contends that the courts create ‘confusion’ by using
different ‘thresholds’ for arbitral ‘good faith’.113
It is suggested that dishonesty is a better yardstick for demarking mediator bad faith
because it suggests a higher standard, but others note that this requires an understanding
of whether or not a mediator’s conduct is judged objectively, which has also led to an
inconsistent approach in the USA case-law.114 This lack of clarity about good faith or
dishonesty has led writers to propose diverse systems for limiting immunity. For
example, Mofﬁtt recommends that qualiﬁed immunity should be based on the
distinction between ‘Custom-Based Claims’, constructed on a common understanding
of mediator standards such as ‘unhelpful suggestions’ or ‘interventions’ or providing a
‘useless agenda’ – or even taking a ‘long cat-nap’ – and ‘Custom-Independent Claims’,
involving conduct such as ‘fraud’ or ‘duress’, or intentionally not revealing
‘conﬂicts’.115 Mofﬁtt concludes that mediators should have no immunity for
‘Custom-Independent’ complaints, but that statutory provision should be designed to
‘bar only Custom-Based suits’, which will prevent ‘harassing litigation’ by the parties
while maintaining the possibility of compensation when there is serious misconduct.116
The advantage of this approach, he suggests, is that it will ensure that the practice of
mediation will retain its ﬂexibility without ‘rigid’ guidelines.117
The problems with deﬁning good faith or dishonesty or establishing set criteria in
relation to mediators’ conduct may be more evident in federal legal systems that have
many different court-annexed mediation programmes, but should the English
jurisdiction move further towards mandatory rules, which some proponents sponsor,118
a consistency of approach and clearly understood concepts on where liability should lie
are essential. The ambiguity experienced by the USA or that of arbitral good faith in
England and Wales might be avoided or reduced for mediator immunity if lessons
can be learnt from other jurisdictions.
The need for mediator immunity should be carefully reviewed by policy makers in
the English jurisdiction. Hughes believes that the formal system in the USA has
mistaken the necessity for shielding mediators and also exaggerated the evidence that
without protection there will be insufﬁcient practitioners in court-connected
schemes.119 Furthermore, he maintains that mediators have been ‘instrumental’ in
generating legislation in the USA and, not wishing to strive for absolute immunity, have111. Ibid, at 145.
112. Departmental Advisory Committee on Arbitration (DAC) Report on Arbitration Bill
(1996). See also Hansard HL Deb, above n 47.
113. See Hebaishi, above n 31, at 24–25, 55; Oyre, above n 32, at 46. See also Mulcahy, above
n 32, at 202, citing Megaw J. in Cannock Chase Council v Kelly [1978] 1 WLR 1 para 6D–E.
114. Cole et al, above n 3, s 16.6.
115. M Mofﬁtt ‘Suing mediators’ (2003) 83 BU L Rev 147 at 195 et seq.
116. Ibid, at 198.
117. Ibid.
118. See above n 3.
119. Hughes, above n 17, at 155–156.
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Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 15‘settled’ for its limited form.120 His analysis of the USA common law cases is that they
‘misconstrue’ a similarity between the ‘function’ of judges and mediators, ‘ignore the
standard tests applied to judicial immunity’ and have leapt to a ‘needs-based argument
that is clearly self-interested and poorly informed’: ‘In the ﬁnal measure, there is
nothing to support immunity for mediators other than the naked self-interest of the
courts and mediators.’121MEDIATOR IMMUNITY IN ENGLAND AND HONG KONG
Both Australia and the USA have taken major steps to move disputes out of litigation
and into court-annexed mediation programmes, which has been accompanied by
implementing statutory immunity to augment the process and elevate the status of
mediators. England has not gone as far down this route, nor has Hong Kong, and
although mediation has a long history in Chinese culture,122 neither country has
implemented mandatory ‘court-annexed programmes as yet, but mediation is ‘court-
connected’ in both jurisdictions. Hong Kong has designed court rules similar to CPR,
which places requirements on the parties to consider ADR and provides courts with
the power to sanction successful litigants for unreasonably refusing an offer to
mediate.123 Hong Kong, however, has taken more ‘afﬁrmative action’ by introducing
a mediation practice protocol, which obligates the parties and their lawyers to lodge
‘mediation certiﬁcates’ with the court, but also provides judges with the power to order
a stay on their own cognisance.124
In contrast to the English jurisdiction, Hong Kong has given careful consideration to
the approaches taken to immunity by other common law countries. Following a report
from the Hong Kong Department of Justice, action was taken in the form of a
‘Mediation Ordinance’ in 2013, but although recommendations were made for a
‘statutory framework’, which set in place rules governing conﬁdentiality, the review
did not advocate immunity for mediators except conceivably on a partial basis for those
working ‘pro-bono’ in the community.125 The report took into consideration a number
of other jurisdictions but concluded that there was insufﬁcient evidence that mediators
required immunity at that time for three reasons.126 First, mediators in the province
mostly used facilitative mediation and were not involved in ‘a judicial function’; nor
was the process compulsory or ‘court-annexed’.127 Secondly, the review did not
indicate that there was a signiﬁcant likelihood that mediators in Hong Kong would120. Ibid, at 155.
121. Ibid, at 169.
122. Zhao and Koo, above n 2, at 677–678.
123. Mediation Ordinance CAP620 2013; see alsoMediation Practice Ordinance, PD 31 pt B9.
See eg Weixia above n 13, at 43.
124. Brooker, above n 41, pp 78–81. For a discussion on developments in Hong Kong, see eg
ibid; Weixia, above n 13, at 78–81; Cheung, above n 13, at 169; C Wall ‘Mediation in the civil
justice system in Hong Kong’ (2009) 73(3) Arbitration 425; C Wall ‘The framework for media-
tion in Hong Kong’ (2009) 75(1) Arbitration 78–85; H Yu ‘The draft Mediation Bill’ (2012) 1
Hong Kong L J 351.
125. Mediation Ordinance CAP620 2013, above n 123; see Hong Kong Report, above n 37, ch
8, Recommendation 39.
126. Hong Kong Report, above n 37, ch 7.163 (2).
127. Ibid, ch 7.163.
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16 Legal Studiesface rising litigation.128 Thirdly, the report suggested that mediators could use ‘con-
tractual immunity’, which was already widespread in Hong Kong, and that they
could take out insurance to protect themselves.129 All of these arguments could be
raised in England and Wales to argue against immunity, but in contrast to assertions
about mediators’ styles, in Hong Kong there is evidence that mediators evaluate and
that some parties prefer this.130
Before continuing with the discussion on whether mediators should be given partial
or even absolute immunity in England and Wales, it is necessary, ﬁrst, to review the
existence of any evidence of misconduct or poor mediation skills; and secondly, what,
if any, potential liabilities mediators face from dissatisﬁed participants.131
THE LACK OF CASES AGAINST MEDIATORS
To date in England and Wales, there have been no reported cases against mediators on
the grounds of their conduct; nor are there noteworthy numbers in other common law
countries, even where there is a substantial mass of mediations taking place each year.
In 2006, Coben and Thompson reported that there was a ‘dearth’ of cases involving
‘mediator misconduct or ethical violations’.132 This research was conﬁrmed in 2013
by Cole et al, who observed how few cases there had been during the 20-year period
of the publicationMediation Principles and Practice; moreover, the authors noted that
even when parties sue mediators, the courts are unlikely to set aside agreements.133 In
Australia, NADRAC reported the occurrence of litigation against mediators to be
negligible apart from Taphooi v Lewenberg.134 Similarly, the Hong Kong Report found
little evidence of cases from its own jurisdiction or others to support legislation for
general immunity at that point in time.135
A number of reasons have been highlighted to explain how few cases have been
brought against mediators. One suggestion is that the parties have already tried to
circumvent litigation and therefore are more likely to turn to another mediator, leaving
only the most ‘determined party’ to litigate.136 Another possible cause of the rarity of
cases is conﬁdentiality, which commentators believe hinders successful litigation
because it precludes evidence being permitted at trial unless certain requirements are
met.137
The effect of conﬁdentiality and without prejudice negotiation
Mediator immunity is connected to the rules of conﬁdentiality because it concerns
balancing whether a party can use evidence from the mediation in order to prove a128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Above n 70.
131. See Mofﬁtt, above n 115, at 130–131. Mofﬁtt counsels that if mediators are aware of
potential liability, this will help them to avoid claims and assist them in explaining their liabilities.
132. J Coben and P Thompson ‘Disputing irony: a systematic look at litigation about media-
tion’ (2006) 11 Harv Negot L Rev 43 at 95.
133. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.13.
134. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4, citing Taphooi, above n 75.
135. Hong Kong Report, above n 37, ch 7.148. See also Zhao and Koo, above n 2.
136. Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 193.
137. See eg Carroll (2001, 2001–2002), above 2; Hughes, above n 17; Cole et al, above n 3.
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Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 17deﬁciency ‘of skill or acceptable behaviour’, but also whether the mediator should be
able to bring evidence to refute such a claim or to show that the ‘mistake was an honest
one’.138 In England, the courts accept that mediation is a ‘form of negotiation’ and
negotiation settlement discussions are protected through the common law rules of
‘without prejudice’, which encourage parties to make concessions or admissions in
the belief that these cannot be used in later litigation.139
The leading authority on without prejudice in mediation in the English jurisdiction is
Farm Assist (2), which held that the rules only apply to the parties and, therefore, if all
parties agree to waive this, the mediator can be called to give evidence.140 The
exceptions to without prejudice in negotiations have been extended to mediation;
therefore, the parties may bring evidence to show that an agreement has been
reached;141 that there has been an ‘estoppel’;142 that the agreement is void or voidable
because of ‘misrepresentation, fraud or undue inﬂuence’,143 that ‘perjury, blackmail or
other unambiguous impropriety’ has been perpetrated;144 to ‘explain delay or apparent
acquiescence’;145 to show ‘whether the claimant has acted reasonably as to his loss’;146
to prove that the ‘offer was expressly made without prejudice as to costs’;147 or – the
most recent addition – to help the court ‘interpret the construction’ of the settlement
agreement.148
Farm Assist (2) also held that conﬁdentiality may arise either through an express term
of the mediation contract, which all the parties including the mediator are bound by, or
by ‘analogy’ with arbitration through an implied term, when all parties including the
mediator have to give consent to evidence being produced in court, which means that
a mediator could refuse.149 Ramsey J held that ‘absolute conﬁdentiality’ was not avail-
able when there has been ‘serious harm’ or a ‘threat of serious harm’ or when it is ‘in the
interests of justice’.150
Despite the arguments made in a number of cases in England, the courts have not
been prepared to accept that there should be a speciﬁc mediation or mediator privilege138. See Carroll (2001), above 2, at 187.
139. Aird v Prime Meridian Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1866 para 5.
140. Farm Assist (2) Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) [2009] EWHC para 44(2). For an analysis of conﬁdentiality in England and Wales,
see eg Brooker, above n 41, ch 5; Burnley and Lascelles, above n 57; M Kallipetis ‘Mediation
privilege and conﬁdentiality and the EU Directive’ in JC Goldsmith, A Ingen-Housz and GH
Pointon (eds) ADR in Business: Practice and Issues Across Countries and Cultures, Volume 2
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 2011); D Cornes ‘Mediation privilege & the EU Directive:
an opportunity?’ (2008) 74(4) Arbitration 384; Toulson and Phipps, above n 41; Koo, above n 41.
141. Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables [1969] 1 WLR 1378.
142. Neuberger J inHodgkinson & Corby v Wards Mobility Services [1997] FSR 178 para 191.
143. Unilever Plc v The Proctor and Gamble Co [2000] WLR 2436.
144. Forster v Friedland (unreported), 10 November 1992; CA (Civil Division) Transcript No
1052 of 1992.
145. Walker v Wilsher (1889) 23 QBD 335.
146. Muller v Linsley & Mortimer [1996] PNLR 74.
147. Cutts v Head [1984] ch 290; Rush & Tomkins & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council
[1989] AC 1280.
148. Oceanbulk Shipping & Trading SAv TMTAsia Ltd [2011] 1 AC 662; Brooker, above n 41,
pp 192–193; M Ahmed ‘Reinforcing the need to protect the without prejudice rule’ (2010) 29(3)
Civ Just Q 303 at 306; E Suter ‘The Devil’s in the detail: interpreting compromise agreements
after Oceanbulk’ (2011) 77 Arbitration 274.
149. Farm Assist (2), above n 140, para 23. See Brooker, above n 41, pp 200–205.
150. Farm Assist (2), above n 140, para 28.
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18 Legal Studiesother than that recognised for family conciliation.151 Legal counsel have utilised the
views of commentators, arguing that the relationship between the mediator and the
party is ‘unique’ because during the caucus, ‘secrets’ are given that enable the mediator
to work towards a consensual outcome,152 which does not usually happen in
negotiations even when there are intermediaries. The court in both Brown v Rice &
Patel [2007] and Cattley & Anor v Pollard [2007] declined to accept that such a
privilege exists, preferring to leave this to the appeal courts or legislation, although
Ramsey J in Farm Assist (2) did recognise that it might be necessary to extend privilege
in the future.153
Commentators observe that there may be a ‘mismatch’ between information given on
conﬁdentiality at the beginning of the process by the mediator and the legal position
should this be raised at a later stage in court, which raises questions about the level
of the parties’ informed consent.154 For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that there
will be radical change to the rules of conﬁdentiality or without prejudice as they apply
to mediation, but it is recommended that the situation should be reviewed in much the
same way as the consultations undertaken in Australia, the USA and Hong Kong.
POTENTIAL CLAIMS AGAINST MEDIATORS
The evidence from the common law countries examined in this paper does not
establish a substantial number of cases where mediators have faced litigation, but
this section will review potential avenues of legal action that may be addressed
by the courts in the English jurisdiction as stronger measures are taken to encourage
the use of mediation. It is likely that common law countries that adopt costs
penalties for refusing to mediate such as used in England and Hong Kong will
see an increase in grievances against mediators, as pressurising parties in this
way may provoke dissatisfaction with their experience.155 Parties have the right151. Per Sir T Bingham MR 238 In Re D (Minors) ‘Conciliation: disclosure of information’,
citing Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone and Lord Simon of Glaisdale in D v National Society
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children [1978] AC 171 paras 231, 238. The court recognised
a ‘new category of privilege based on the public interest in the stability of marriage’.
152. See eg Mr Justice Briggs ‘Mediation privilege’ (2009) 159 New L J Issue 7363, 506; Mr
Justice Briggs ‘Mediation privilege’ (2009) 159 New L J Issue 7363, 550.
153. See eg R Field andNWood ‘Marketingmediation ethically: the case of conﬁdentiality’ (2005)
5 Qld U Tech L & Just J 143 at 145–146; Brown v Rice & Patel [2007] EWHC 625 paras 19–20;
Cattley & Anor v Pollard [2007] ECHC 3130 (Ch) paras 9–10; Farm Assist (2), above n 140, para 43.
154. P Brooker ‘Towards a code of professional conduct for construction mediators’ (2011) 3
(1) Int’l J L Built Envt 24; J Nolan-Haley ‘Informed consent in mediation: a guiding principle
for truly educated decision-making’ (1999) 74 Notre Dame L Rev 775; S Imperati ‘Mediator
practice models: the intersection of ethics and stylistic practices in mediation’ (1997) 33
Willamette L Rev 703; N Alexander ‘Mediation and the art of regulation’ (2008) 8(1) Qld
U Tech L & Just J 1–23; T Sourdin ‘Australian National Mediator Accreditation Scheme:
report on the project’ (2007), available at http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/professional/
adr/documents/AccreditationReportSept07.pdf (accessed 3 March 2010).
155. See eg M Brunsdon-Tully, above n 13, at 218; Brooker, above n 41; H Genn ‘The
privatisation of civil justice is a rule of law issue’ 36th FA Mann Lecture Lincoln’s Inn, 19 No-
vember 2012; H Genn et al Twisting Arm: Court Referred and Court Linked Mediation under Ju-
dicial PressureMinistry of Justice Research Series 1/07May 2007; NADRAC 2011, above n 3, s
5.4. The NADRAC report also warns of the likely increase of cases in Australia as the number of
mediations rises.
© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 19to leave mediation156 but once the process has started, substantial costs for preparing to
mediate and lawyers’ fees if used will have amassed and, moreover, pursuing settlement
through the courts after a failed mediation will in all probability lead to sizeable litiga-
tion costs.
Liabilities in ﬁduciary duties, contract, tort of negligence and misconduct
Claims against mediators are likely to centre on issues of ‘competency, care or miscon-
duct’,157 which can involve ‘breach of contract, tortuous liability or even criminal lia-
bility in serious cases’.158 Other ‘causes of action’ may involve breaches of
‘professional obligations’, ‘discrimination and harassment’ or ‘ﬁduciary duties’.159
Commentators have drawn up speciﬁc lists of complaints that mediators might face,
including: misleading parties about the ‘purpose or nature’ of mediation or their
‘qualiﬁcations’; ‘breaches of conﬁdentiality’;160 failing to identify that the dispute is
inappropriate for mediation; using ‘duress, undue inﬂuence or undue pressure’ to force
a settlement; ‘negligence in drafting the settlement agreement’, ‘defamation’; ‘bias’; or
‘failing to disclose conﬂicts of interest’.161
Explicit mediator activities that may lead to grievances could be failing to arrive on
time, stopping the process at the wrong point or not bringing the process to a close when
circumstances indicate that it should be terminated.162 Unacceptable levels of care may
focus on ‘incorrect professional’ or ‘legal advice’, not disclosing potential threats of
violence, making ‘unauthorised disclosures’ or not preventing the parties from signing
an ‘illegal agreement’.163 Moreover, allegations against mediators have involved
‘`unprofessional and overbearing’ behaviour or ‘deceptive’ conduct, or even ‘fraud’.164
Liability through ﬁduciary duty
Scholars in the USA have promoted the extension of ﬁduciary duties to mediators in
order to provide parties with a cause of action and a remedy.165 In the English
jurisdiction, ﬁduciary duties are established when one party has ‘assumed responsibil-
ity’ for the ‘affairs’ of another person, which involves ‘normally a duty of care’ but156. Some countries’ state or court rules require parties to remain in mediation for a speciﬁed
time. For example, Hong Kong’s Mediation Practice Directive PD31 requires ‘a minimum level
of participation’, which is suggested ‘might be at least one substantive session’ (at App C). See eg
Brooker, above n 5, at 147–148.
157. Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 190.
158. See eg Zhao and Koo, above n 2, at 681; Mofﬁtt, above n 93; Carroll (2001, 2001–2002),
above n 2; Coben and Thompson, above n 132; Cole et al, above n 3.
159. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4. NADRAC lists potential liability, which includes
‘misleading and deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) or state/territory fair
trading laws’.
160. Mofﬁtt, above n 93, at 81. Mofﬁtt identiﬁes that mediators can breach conﬁdentiality
‘internally’ by revealing information to the other side without consent, as well as ‘externally’,
to people outside the process.
161. See NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.3. See also Carroll (2001), n 2, at 189–192; Cole et
al, above n 3, s 7; Coben and Thompson, above n 132; Zhao and Koo, above n 2.
162. Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 190.
163. Ibid.
164. Carroll (2001, 2001–2002), above n 2.
165. See eg Hughes, above n 17; Chaykin, above n 48.
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20 Legal Studiesimportantly does not require either ‘mutual dealings’ or even a contractual ‘relation-
ship’ to exist.166 This equitable relationship is one of ‘trust and conﬁdence’, which
has a ‘distinguishing obligation of loyalty’.167
Chaykin believes that the relationship between mediators and the parties is
‘ﬂexible enough’ to provide circumstances in which a party may need ‘protection’
and, moreover, the advantage of a ﬁduciary duty is that it can be ‘imposed’ without
any contract being in existence.168 He contends that a mediator need not fear the
extension of ﬁduciary duties because it only requires that they ‘act in good faith,
be diligent, honest, and unbiased, and not seek to proﬁt at the expense of his
clients’.169
Cases in the USA demonstrate that parties have claimed, often with other causes
of action, that a mediator has breached a ﬁduciary duty;170 moreover, the relation-
ship was acknowledged in Furia v Helm.171 Other common law jurisdictions are
yet to determine this point but may be persuaded by Mofﬁtt, who maintains that
there are difﬁculties in ﬁnding that a mediator owes ‘simultaneous ﬁduciary
obligations to participants with opposing interests’.172 Other scholars contend that
there are sufﬁcient remedies through contractual or tortious obligations; or that as
mediation use increases, so will the professionalism of mediators, which will be
accompanied by a standardisation of practice against which practitioners’ conduct
can be judged.173The contractual basis of liability
When the basis of complaint by the parties is in breach of contract, NADRAC 2006
observes that future litigation is likely to be about the failure to ‘exercise reasonable
care and skill’ or about ‘impartiality and conﬁdentiality’ issues, which can be through
either ‘implied or express terms’.174 However, the Australian report indicates that
claims on this basis will be difﬁcult to prove and ﬁnancial compensation is not
‘punitive’.175 Furthermore, there are difﬁculties in establishing liability because the166. Lord Justice Brown-Wilkinson in White v Jones (1995) 2 AC 206 at 271. Two daughters
sued a solicitors ﬁrm that had failed to change their father’s will on his request before his death.
See S Worthington ‘Fiduciaries: when is self-denial obligatory?’ (1999) 58 Camb L J 500 at 500.
Fiduciary duties are similarly described in the Australian jurisdiction; see Worthington, ibid, at
505–506, who cites Products v United States at Surgical Corporation (1984) HCA 64.
167. Lord Justice Millett in Mothew v Bristol and West Building Society [1996] EWCA Civ
533. See Worthington, above n 166, at 502.
168. Chaykin, above n 48, at 764; see also Chaykin, above n 2, at 70–71.
169. Chaykin, above n 48, at 749.
170. See Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.14, citing Jaufman v Levine, 2007 WL 2891987 (NDNY
2007), where a claim of breaches of ‘contract negligence and breach of ﬁduciary duty’ was
allowed to continue.
171. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4.3, citingDavid Furia v Hugh N. Helm III, Court of Ap-
peals of California, 1st District, 3rd Division, Rehearing Denied, 24 September 2003; 4 Cal Rptr
3d 358.
172. Mofﬁtt, above n 115, at 147, 167; NADRAC (2006) s 5.4.3, which highlights the debate
on imposing ﬁduciary duties on mediators.
173. See eg Carroll (2001, 2001–2002), above n 2; Cole et al, above n 3.
174. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4.1. See also Hong Kong Report, above n 37, ch 7.144.
175. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4.1.
© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 21‘standard of care’ that the contractual parties agreed to may contain a ‘variety of terms
and expressions that can be written, implied or orally agreed’.176
Contractual defences to avoid enforcement of settlement
In the USA, Coben and Thompson drew up a database of 1223 mediation cases but
found that only 17 concerned the enforcement of the settlement agreement involving
claims about the conduct of the mediator.177 The researchers found ten challenges
based on mediators’ conduct that involved the contractual defence of duress or
undue inﬂuence and highlighted some of the alleged ‘horribles’ occurring during
the process.178 Most of these allegations comprised of using pressure tactics by
warning of the unlikely success at court or the interpretation that the judge may take
if there is no settlement, and in one case using the mediator’s success rate to try to
coerce the party to settle.179 However, their analysis of these cases found that the
courts viewed such behaviour as legitimate ‘reality testing’ rather than miscon-
duct.180 The authors reported one successful case of undue inﬂuence involving a
claim that the mediator, during an ‘eight hour mediation’, ‘threatened’ to inform
the judge that the failure to reach settlement was the fault of the claimant, told
her she would not succeed at court, used scare tactics about future legal costs
and, furthermore, warned her that she risked a reduction of her ‘pensions’.181 Coben
and Thompson state that the court had to ‘invent a legal theory based on mediator
misconduct’, because undue inﬂuence must emanate from the other contractual
party, not a third person.182
Mediator conduct: bias and conﬂicts of interest in settlement enforcement
Coben and Thompson’s database had 12 cases concerning claims of bias (or conﬂicts
of interest); the ‘majority’ of which were settled by disclosure of evidence, but in
some cases this was not sufﬁcient; for example, where the mediator was also the
‘guardian ad litem’, which was found to be a conﬂicted role.183 Esquibel argues
forcibly against giving immunity to ‘conﬂicted mediators’ because of their interest
in settlement, which jeopardises mediation’s core principles, thereby nullifying the
process and eventually leading to a loss of conﬁdence in mediating:184
With respect to the speciﬁc participants, a conﬂicted mediator threatens the parties’ self-
determination and the voluntary nature of the process. Without these features, mediation
is an empty process.176. Ibid.
177. Coben and Thompson, above n 132, at 95; Mofﬁtt, above, n 93, at 81. Mofﬁtt estimated in
2003 that ‘hundreds of thousands or even millions’ of mediations had taken place but that there
were very few cases against mediators.
178. Coben and Thompson, above n 132, at 96–97.
179. Ibid, at 96–97
180. Ibid, at 96.
181. Ibid, citing Vitakis-Valchine v Valchine, 793 So 2d 1094, 1096–1097 (Fla Dist Ct App
2001) 4th Dist.
182. Coben and Thompson, above n 132, at 97.
183. Ibid, at 98, citing as an example Isaacson v Isaacson, 792 A.2d 525 (NJ Super Ct App Div
2002) NJ Super Ct 560.
184. Esquibel, above n 2, at 160.
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Mediator liabilities in tort may occur for ‘negligence, defamation or statutory torts’ such
as ‘discrimination’ or ‘harassment’.185 Claimants must establish that a duty of care
exists, that it was breached and that the breach caused ‘foreseeable losses to the client’,
but successful litigants also have to prove that they have ‘genuinely suffered damage’
caused ‘solely’ by the mediator’s conduct.186 Doubt is expressed about the likely
success of such a claim because of the difﬁculties in proving a ‘causal link’ between
the mediator’s conduct and the ﬁnal mediated outcome, for which the parties are
responsible.187 Moreover, Stulberg argues that mediators should not be ‘held liable’
when the parties decide to settle at a point that is not necessarily the ‘optimal outcome’,
as there could be other factors inﬂuencing the decision.188
One issue that creates problems with ﬁnding liability in tort in many common law
countries is that there little conformity over training, standards of practice and
competency, which makes it problematic to demonstrate that the mediator has breached
a duty of care to those participating in the mediation.189 When a mediator has been
negligent, Cole et al maintain that to succeed in the USA the claimant must prove that
the mediator was ‘inept’ and ‘failed to exercise or have the special skills, knowledge or
training that a mediator in good standing in the community should have’.190 Where
states have implemented rules on qualiﬁcation for mediators operating in court-annexed
programmes or other bodies have developed standards of practice, these could act as a
benchmark for competency, but Cole et al observe that court rules in the USA are
usually too ‘vague’ to determine when they have been breached and that courts
‘struggle’ to establish a standard of care.191
‘The Model Standard of Conduct for Mediators’ in the USA does not offer a
benchmark of competent skills, though it sets out in s 4a that ‘A person who offers to
serve as a mediator creates the expectation that the person is competent to mediate
effectively’.192 ‘The Model Standards’ leave it to the parties to be ‘satisﬁed’ with
‘the mediator’s competence and qualiﬁcation’ and state that mediators should attend
continuing education to ‘enhance those skills’, but otherwise there is no further
clariﬁcation to aid when standards have been breached.193
Coben and Thompson’s study only found four cases where the mediator was the
‘defendant’ in a tort claim.194 In one cited case, Lehrer v Zwernemann, there were a
number of claims concerning ‘negligence or legal malpractice, breach of contract,
breach of ﬁduciary duty, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations, fraud, and185. NADRAC (2011), above n 3, s 5.4.2.
186. Ibid; see also Stulberg, above n 2.
187. See also Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 193.
188. Stulberg, above n 2, at 85.
189. See for example; Cole et al, above n 3. s 11.13, Carroll (2001–2002), above n 2, at 195.
190. Cole et al, above n 3, s 11.13.
191. Ibid, citingChang’s Imports Inc. v Strader 216 F Supp 2d 325 (SDNY 2002), which found
that ‘there is almost no law on what the appropriate standard of case is, if any, for a mediator who
helps negotiate a settlement between parties’.
192. ‘The model standard of conduct for mediators’, available at http://www.mediate.com/ar-
ticles/model_standards_of_conﬂict.cfmhe_updated (accessed 20 April 2015). See also Cole et
al, above n 3, s11.13; Mofﬁtt, above n 93, at 85–86.
193. ‘The model standards of conduct for mediators’, ibid, s IV A.
194. Coben and Thompson, above n 132, at 98.
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Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 23conspiracy to commit fraud’.195 When analysing the case, the authors found that the
court did not consider a ‘standard’ of practice for mediators but, rather, deliberated
on their role as ‘facilitators’ of settlement and concluded that this had been achieved;
furthermore, the plaintiff could not identify the ‘injury caused by the mediator’.196
The avenues of redress may be relatively wide but available case-law in the USA,
which has experienced more cases against mediators than most countries, indicates that
there are problems in establishing causation and also difﬁculties in determining a
standard of care that against which the mediator can be judged. This is particularly
problematic in countries that have yet to address or ﬁnalise the regulation of mediators
or their ofﬁcial accreditation. Mediation is still a relatively new development in the
English jurisdiction, but there is now a growth industry in training mediators and an
evolving debate on how to appropriately regulate practice, which is connected to the
question of immunity because legal action against mediators will depend on accepted
standards of practice.197 This issue will be addressed in the following section before
considering what action, if any, England and Wales should take about mediator
immunity.THE REGULATION OF MEDIATOR PRACTICE
The problems of ﬁnding a standard of care against which mediators can be judged is
highlighted when there are calls for professionalising mediation practice. The
development of a profession is accompanied by regulating standards of practice and
controlling entrance to membership through establishing training requirements.198
One of the key difﬁculties faced by countries that have introduced regulation has been
the problem of establishing a ‘standardised’ deﬁnition of mediation that incorporates
different models of practice but, speciﬁcally, one that acknowledges the distinction
between facilitative and evaluative mediator techniques.199 The use of a narrow
classiﬁcation of mediation such as a facilitative process potentially bars somemediators
from practising.200 Common law countries that have already begun or completed a
regulation regime witnessed an ‘intense debate’201 between two competing groups:
those arguing for ‘consumer protection’ and practitioners who want to keep ‘ﬂexibility’
over how they mediate, which Alexander calls the ‘consistency–diversity dilemma’.202
As discussed above, one of the major contentions for not providing mediators with
immunity is that it is a facilitative process and not a decision making one, which
therefore does not require protection against legal action. Yet ‘pure’ facilitative195. Ibid, citing Lehrer v Zwernemann, 14 SW 3d 775 (Tex App Houston 1st Dist 2000).
196. See Coben and Thompson, above n 132, at 98.
197. NADRAC (2006), above n 3, s 8.26.
198. C Menkel-Meadow ‘Are there systematic ethics issues in Dispute Systems Design?’
(2009) 14 Harv Negot L Rev 195; B Clark Lawyers and Mediation (London: Springer, 2012)
ch 3; Alexander, above n 1.
199. Alexander, above n 154, at 2. See for example, Riskin, above n 68, at 7; K Mills ‘Can a
single ethical code respond to all models of mediation?’ (2005) 21 Bond Disp Resol News 5.
200. Alexander, above n 154; A Boon, R Earle and AWhyte ‘Regulating mediators?’ (2007) 10
(1) Legal Ethics 26 at 43; J South ‘Development of mediator training in England and Wales’
(2009), available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/southJ1.cfm (accessed 30 May 2009).
201. Brooker, above n 41, p 253.
202. Alexander, above n 154, p 2.
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24 Legal Studiesmediation appears to be relatively rare in practice, and many empirical studies,
including those in England and Wales, indicate that mediators do utilise evaluative
techniques and should at the very least obtain the parties’ ‘informed consent’ to
furnishing such advice.203 Australia, which introduced a National Mediator
Accreditation Scheme (NMAS) in 2008, put in a voluntary system to manage the
‘consistency–diversity’ issue, which requires mediators who evaluate or provide
opinions to show that they have the relevant ‘professional qualiﬁcations’ to offer this
advice and that they are gaining the parties’ ‘consent’ to this.204
In theory, mediators can still work without qualiﬁcations in England and Wales,
which is also true for arbitrators, although the parties have statutory protections
under the AA 1996, which allows limited ‘challenges’ to an award or permits the
court to remove an arbitrator under speciﬁed circumstances.205 There is now consid-
erable interest from mediators to increase work opportunities by professionalising
practice.206 In some areas, practice is overviewed by professional bodies; for
example, solicitors or barristers or chartered surveyors can register on their
professions’ mediator panels if they have the requisite training requirements
and qualiﬁcations.207 However, mediators are not overseen by any central body,
although regulation is being championed by the Civil Mediation Council
(CMC), which sets criteria for training, continuing professional development,
complaints systems and insurance; furthermore, each member must adopt a code
of practice equivalent to that of the European Code of Practice for Mediators.208
The CMC has many afﬁliated UK training organisations and now accepts
voluntary registration by individual members, which will lead to a normalisation
of practise as established levels of competency are met and should provide a
standard of care against which mediators may be judged in future litigation.209
The CMC accreditation scheme in England and Wales has no prescriptive require-
ments on acceptable mediation models or the ‘orientation’ mediators must adopt,
and nor do other professional bodies; therefore evaluative, facilitative or some other203. See for example, Riskin, above n 68; Kovach and Love, above n 70; Stulberg, above n 70;
in England and Wales, see eg Brooker, above n 70; Clark, above n 198.
204. Australia National Mediator Standards (2007, 2008); Australian National Mediator
Standards: Commentary on Approval Standards, available at http://www.nswbar.asn.au/docs/
professional/adr/documents/Commentaryonpracticestndrds.pdf (accessed 3 March 2010).
Brooker, above n 41, pp 255–256; Sourdin, above n 154. Since 1 July 2015, the NMAS has been
included in the National Mediator Accreditation System; see http://www.msb.org.au/mediator-
standards (accessed 27 April 2016).
205. Oyre, above n 32, at 49–50. Oyre suggests that examples of ‘bad faith’ are illustrated in s
24(1), which permits the court to ‘remove an arbitrator’ under identiﬁed circumstances such as
when there has been a failure to ‘properly conduct proceedings’, subsection (d)(i), or when delay
will cause ‘substantial injustice’, (d)(ii), or where ‘circumstances exist’ that cast ‘justiﬁable
doubts as to his impartiality’. See also Mulcahy, above n 32, p 204, who observes that the parties
are not provided with redress for ‘wasted costs or delay’.
206. CEDR Mediation Audit 2014, above n 49, at 10.
207. See eg Brooker, above n 41, pp 250–252; Boon et al, above n 200.
208. See eg Brooker, above n 41; Boon et al, above n 200; A Bucklow ‘The ‘everywhen’ me-
diator: the virtues of inconsistency and paradox: the strength, skills, attributes and behaviours of
excellent and effective mediators’ (2007) 73(1) Int’l J Arbit, Mediat & Disp Mgmt 40.
209. In March 2015, the CMC launched its registration scheme for individual members; see http://
www.civilmediation.org/about-cmc/15/accredited-mediation-providers (accessed 8 March 2015).
© 2016 The Society of Legal Scholars
Mediator immunity: time for evaluation in England and Wales? 25type of mediation practice is acceptable.210 The facilitative/evaluative debate has
been raised in England and Wales, but little attention is given to it in what is a
relatively quiet regulation movement where support is not unanimous and many
insist that there is little proof of poor standards warranting action, or that ‘market
demand’ by ‘repeat users’ will exclude incompetent practitioners from future
work.211 Nevertheless, it is probably heartening to those who wish to regulate
mediation practice to ﬁnd that CEDR’s Mediator Audit in 2014 reported that 64%
of respondents approved the action taken by the CMC to implement registration
for ‘individual mediators’ with a ‘basic standard of competency’, and that there
was a consensus that increasing mediation should be through professionalising
practice.212 It is likely that any future action taken by the CMC to set down
competency standards will be supported by practitioners if it leads to the recognition
of a mediator profession and subsequent growth of their mediation practices.DISCUSSION
As yet, England and Wales are in the early stages of regulation, professionalism and
competency debates, but these are mutually connected and inextricably linked to the
question of immunity. The concept of immunity goes beyond protecting the parties
from mediator misconduct, negligence or the rules governing conﬁdentiality, because
it concerns the policy reasons given to support the expansion of mediation and its
relationship to the formal system of litigation.213 The main purpose behind immunity
is the role that mediators play in the ‘administration of justice’, on the grounds that
the ‘process’ of mediation has become an integral part of the provision of settlement
opportunities, which relieves resourcing pressures on the courts but also brings
advantages to the parties.214 Carroll suggests that immunity is given in order to preserve
the ‘attractiveness and integrity’ of mediation as well as supporting ‘the ﬁnality of
disputes’.215 If the principal reason is to protect the ‘process’, commentators contend
that mediators should only be given immunity when they work in ‘court-annexed’
programmes and not in the private sector.216
In England andWales, mediation has been a strategic part of the reforms of litigation
since the implementation of CPR, and although the process remains voluntary, there are
prominent calls for a change in policy that would permit judges to refer the parties to
mediation without their consent.217 Moreover, as noted above, there are several
automatic referral programmes and judges mediate in the TCC; therefore, the argument
could be made out by those favouring immunity that mediation is already ‘part of the210. Brooker, above n 41, pp 258–259; Brooker, above n 154; Riskin, above n 68, at 7.
211. Boon et al, above n 200, at 48–49; N Gould, C King and A Hudson-Tyreman The Use of
Mediation in Construction Disputes: Summary Report of the Final Results (London: King’s
College London, May 2009) p 27, available at http://www.fenwickelliott.com/ﬁles/Summary%
20Report%20of%20the%20Final%20Results.pdf (accessed 7 November 2010); above n 163, p 66.
212. CEDR Audit, above n 49, at 10.
213. Carroll (2001), above n 2, at 205.
214. See eg Esquibel, above n 2, at 149–150.
215. Carroll (2001–2002), above n 2, at 182–183.
216. See eg NADRAC (2006, 2011), above n 3.
217. See eg above n 4; Sir AlanWard inWright v Michael Wright Supplies Ltd & Anor, above n
5, at 3; Lord Justice Clarke, above n 4; Brooker, above n 5, at 151; Allen, above n 4.
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26 Legal Studiesjudicial process’ through court-connection and that the mediators’ ‘performance’ or the
settlement ‘outcome’ could be in jeopardy if there is a risk of litigation.218
Although at present in England and Wales it is unlikely that statutory steps will be
taken in relation to immunity, the matter could be in the hands of the judiciary in the
near future and policy makers may ﬁnd it constructive to review the approaches taken
in other countries. The incidence of small claims mediation is now estimated to involve
many tens of thousands of cases, although other schemes promoted by the courts are not
well documented.219 As the numbers increase, the probability of litigation against
mediators escalates and the question of immunity could become a live issue for the
common law.
The judiciary in England andWales may decide, if the opportunity arises, to keep the
status quo, particularly as several High Court judges remain obdurate that a ‘special
privilege’ for mediators should be the domain of the legislature.220 On the other hand,
a ‘pioneering’ judgment, particularly in the Court of Appeal, could be inﬂuenced by a
judge’s ‘ideological’221 stance about mediation, or even by an ‘anti-litigation’
attitude,222 where support for mediator immunity is seen as a necessary concomitant
to legal reform. If left to the common law, the decision may be inﬂuenced by policy
and resource considerations, as the review of Australia and USA shows, but there
is little justiﬁcation to give immunity at the expense of protecting the parties who
may have had substantial pressure put on them by the judicial system to mediate
and might have limited resources to sue mediators, should a qualiﬁed immunity be
found to exist. Any level of immunity should be founded on carefully considered
justiﬁcations, and the right that the parties have to seek a remedy should not be eroded
by competing policies that are based on resource implications for the courts.
Cole et al recommend ‘reﬂection’ before the introduction of any new mediation law,
because ad-hoc measures may result in ‘unintended consequences’; for example, the
authors note that mediator immunity may diminish ‘public conﬁdence’ in the process
if it denies a remedy to those who have been ‘wronged’ by mediators:223
The parties’ conﬁdence in mediation depends in part on their belief that mediation will ‘do no
harm’ and stands a good chance of improving their situation. Some laws designed to achieve
other aims might unwittingly undermine this conﬁdence… There is also some question about
whether too broad a mediation privilege might undermine public conﬁdence in mediation, if it
shields attorneys or mediators by precluding liability for malfeasance during mediation.
The purpose of this paper is not to advocate mediator immunity – not least
because mediation remains a voluntary, albeit a court-connected, process in England
and Wales, which weakens any argument for its extension – but to raise awareness
of the conceivable negative impact on mediation if the question comes before the218. See discussion above. See eg NADRAC (2006), above n 3, ss 8.20, 8.30; Hong Kong
Report, above n 78, para 7.149.
219. See http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/moj/cheaper,-quicker-and-less-daunt-
ing-justice (accessed 17 July 2015). The government plans to divert 80,000 cases into the SCMS.
220. See eg Brown v Rice & Patel, above n 153, para 20; Cattley & Anor v Pollard, above n
153, paras 9, 10; Farm Assist (2), above n 140, para 43.
221. S Shipman ‘Court approaches to ADR in the civil justice system’ (2006) 25 Civ Just Q 181
at 211.
222. HGenn Judging Civil Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) pp 119–121.
223. Cole et al, above n 3, s 16.6.
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reforms drift towards reducing the parties’ self-determination about whether to
mediate or which mediators to use, particularly when some automatic schemes are
organised by the HMCTS or by court-sponsored providers, the process could be
become discredited.
Currently, there is only an emerging voluntary regulation system and common
law developments or court rules could take place without review of the
‘consequences’ of immunity.224 Where the process has become an adjunct to
the court, either through rules nurturing engagement or as part of judicial case
management, then mediators must have a clear understanding of their responsibilities,
and appropriate standards of practice should be in place in order that parties with little
choice about mediating are protected from the conceivable existence of poor-quality
mediators or those that act fraudulently or maliciously.
CONCLUSION
English law has not yet engaged in extensive debate on the standard of care owed to
parties by mediators or whether mediators have immunity from legal action. At present,
there is little evidence to suggest that there is concern about the quality of mediators or
that there are cases implicating misconduct, but as mediation numbers multiply,
inevitably some parties will be unhappy with their experience. Parties who are
increasingly pushed towards mediation through court rules, case management or court
schemes deserve to have a means of redress and an expectation that the mediators
dealing with their case have reached an acceptable standard of practice.
To overlook the immunity debate until there are more cases against mediators
without ﬁrst assuring the quality of practice may produce unnecessary disquiet from
users. It would be undesirable that the public lose conﬁdence in either the process of
mediation or mediators when it does provide an alternative to litigation and can put
the parties in ‘control’ of their settlement options.225 Future developments in any of
these spheres should be taken with an all-encompassing review of the issues.
Having reviewed the debate on mediation immunity and the problems involved in
regulating a developing mediation profession anxious to extend their practice, it is
recommended that future policies that might involve further compulsion to mediate
or create benchmarks by which to evaluate mediators’ competencies or deliberate on
immunity should not be left to the vagaries of the common law. Those who are
concerned with mediation policy in England and Wales should be obliged to engage
in a review of the consequences of such developments, because it would be regrettable
if there was a failure to give sufﬁcient regard to whether a framework is in place to
safeguard participants who may be injured by indeterminate mediator standards; or that
rules are developed which result in protecting incompetent or malicious practitioners.
England and Wales has the advantage of learning from other common law countries
before law is instituted, which may in the long run reduce the risk of damage to the
reputation of mediation and mediators.224. Ibid.
225. See Turner, above n 2, at 776.
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